[WCUSP] Fwd: Israeli Reactions to "A Guide to a Successful November International Conference" - IPF Focus Vol. 5.31

Thu Oct 18 12:11:26 CDT 2007

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From: Israel Policy Forum <ipfdc at ipforumdc.org>
Date: Oct 18, 2007 12:29 PM
Subject: Israeli Reactions to "A Guide to a Successful November
International Conference" - IPF Focus Vol. 5.31
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October 18, 2007 / VOLUME 5.31Printer Friendly Version

Israeli Reactions to "A Guide to a Successful November International Conference"

 Last week, IPF Focus presented the IPF Study Group paper entitled "A
Guide to a Successful November International Conference." It was
signed by six former U.S. officials and specialists. The report can be
found online at www.ipforum.org.

 This week we present comments on and critiques of the report from
four major figures in Israel: Ephraim Sneh, Labor MK and former Deputy
Defense Minister; Prof. Naomi Chazan, political scientist and former
Meretz MK; Major Gen. (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, former head of Military
Intelligence; and Colette Avital, Labor MK and former Consul General
of New York. Our intent is to expand the discussion regarding the
forthcoming international conference.

MK Ephraim Sneh's Comments

 The authors suggest various ways to co-opt Hamas, to bring it into
the process at a a later stage. This idea, which is quite central in
the paper, is based on two assumptions:

 1) A "soft" policy toward Hamas may dissuade it from torpedoing the conference.
 2) A Palestinian national consensus on final-status issues is
achievable down the road.

 Both are baseless illusions because the Hamas ideology prohibits
acceptance of any agreement which gives legitimacy to the Jewish
state, calls for an end to the conflict, and does not include the
right of return for refugees to the 1948 boundaries.

 Two gaps are unbridgeable. The first is between the ultra-Islamist
Hamas and the secular minded Fatah about the character of both
Palestinian society and the Palestinian state. The second is between
Hamas and the Israeli peace camp about the principles and the details
of the permanent-status agreement. No kid-gloves policy toward Hamas
can make these gaps bridgeable.

 An Israeli-Palestinian agreement along the principles that are
enshrined in this paper is supported, according to all reliable polls,
by two-thirds of the Israelis and two-thirds of the Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On both sides one third will vehemently
oppose it. On the other hand, and in contradiction to the assumption
of the authors, Hamas's popularity has been declining since it took
over the Palestinian parliament, and more steeply after the coup in
Gaza. It is true that a third of the Palestinians in the territories
(those who live in the Gaza Strip) are under the Hamas regime, but
that doesn't mean that they support it.

 On the Israeli side, the proposed Statement of Understanding (SOU)
would enjoy a majority in the Knesset, not much beyond the needed
number (61), but more than Rabin had for the Oslo Accord in 1993. The
Israeli right-wing will try all kinds of extra-parliamentary means to
impede the success of the Annapolis conference.

 Iran, which supplies Hamas and the PIJ with unlimited sums of money
and extensive military support, will use them as leverage for foiling
the upcoming conference through the staging of spectacular terror
attacks. If such attacks occur, the best way to repulse the
perpetrators is to continue the preparations ceaselessly and not to
stop it "till things calm down and the atmosphere is less tense"—as
was the knee-jerk reaction during previous such events.

 Instead of wasting energy on futile efforts to reach consensus on
both sides, the international community and especially the United
States should bolster the moderate leadership in Israel and Palestine
and encourage success in Annapolis. If the conference fails, or its
outcome is disappointing, both moderate leaderships will be replaced
by extremist hard-liners sooner or later.

 Three more comments:

 1) If a SOU is achieved, the Saudis will come. What is good enough
for the streets in Ramallah is good enough for the palaces in Riyadh.
If they refuse to come in spite of an Israeli-Palestinian agreed-upon
formula, it means that they should not be there. For a second Mecca
Accord, there is no need for a conference in Annapolis.

 2) Follow-up conferences as suggested are a good idea. It provides
milestones for progress during 2008. But these conferences should not
be a substitute for a concrete timetable for concrete negotiations
that will start soon after the November conference.

 3) Former Prime Minister Blair is in charge of economic development
and the construction of a strong Palestinian government. He is the one
who is supposed to provide the tangible incentives that are
indispensable for the success of the entire process. His work should
bring about visible benefits to both people, mainly to the
Palestinians. They both support the negotiations (at least the vast
majority), but they are very skeptical about its results. Economic
improvements will show that moderation, not violence, pays. That is
why it is so important that the efforts to prepare the conference do
not distract from the support of governments and corporations that
Blair needs so much to succeed.

Professor Naomi Chazan's Comments

 "A Guide to a Successful November International Conference" is by far
the most reasoned, crafted, and helpful document currently circulating
in anticipation of the forthcoming Annapolis conference. In tone and
content, it lays out reasonable expectations and reasoned suggestions
for a successful meeting. Its blue-ribbon panel of experts correctly
cautions against the consequences of failure and proceeds to lay out
key steps to enhance a positive outcome.

 Since I agree entirely with the definition of a successful conference
presented in this paper (the creation of substantive momentum toward a
negotiated two-state solution) and with the thrust of its
recommendations on content, procedures and goals, I will focus on five
specific aspects of the report which I find problematic.

 1. The introduction of the idea of a facilitating agreement (# 5) to
enable movement from Annapolis to the next meeting runs the risk of
complicating, rather than enabling, progress. It tries to pack the
main topics covered in Phase I of the Roadmap (including full
cessation of violence, dismantling of illegal outposts, freezing of
settlements) into a new wrapping. By doing so it once again places a
set of prerequisites on forward movement without specifying measures
or mechanisms for their fulfillment. This approach was one of the main
causes for the failure of Oslo and for the subsequent paralysis of the
Roadmap. This mistake should not be repeated now, especially since the
negotiation of such a facilitating agreement constitutes a major
diversion from the challenge of reaching a comprehensive accord on
permanent settlement issues within a reasonable time frame.

 2. This same weakness recurs in the discussion of the next conference
(#7), which suggests that it be convened only if, and when, progress
has been recorded in a particular area or the terms of the
facilitating agreement have been realized. This creates a
performance-bound process which smacks of the same step-by-step
approach that has failed repeatedly since first attempted in Oslo. Its
drawbacks are well known: it is piecemeal and cannot respond to the
urgency of the situation, it is open to multiple interpretations and
it is far from expeditious. The alternative would be to establish a
firm timetable of meetings and a deadline for the conclusion of
substantive talks.

 3. Not surprisingly, the same type of thinking repeats itself in the
discussion of incentives (#8). Built into these suggestions are
partial measures to increase confidence and allay fears. Falling back
yet again on steps to increase trust threatens to prolong a process
which must not be extended indefinitely. It also presumes that a
tangible sense of amelioration facilitates negotiations. The precise
opposite may be more apt: successful negotiations leading to an end to
the occupation and the creation of a viable Palestinian state may be
the only way to lay the groundwork for greater mutual confidence.

 4. For these reasons, the determination of the composition of
conference participants (#6) is so important. I support the quest for
broad regional participation and the rationale behind it; I am also
convinced that Hamas involvement is essential for the implementation
of any future agreement. But there is no reference to civil society
actors in these pages, and specifically to substantial gender
representation in the conference. The gap between leaders and their
publics made it virtually impossible to reach understanding in the
past. A new effort requires the rectification of this error. The
present process must be transparent and consultative. The only way it
can meet these criteria is by being consciously inclusive. Bringing
women and key social actors to the table is a much more effective
means of assuaging suspicion than any specific confidence building
measure.

 5. The possibility of breakdown (# 9) does indeed loom large. The
Annapolis conference might not take place, it may be postponed, or it
could fail to achieve minimal understanding. The response cannot and
should not be merely to persevere. One of the critical lessons learned
from previous Palestinian-Israeli negotiations is that all too often
critical meetings were convened without any fallback plan. Annapolis
should not be added to this list. Any serious planning for the
upcoming conference must include at least two clear alternatives that
can be set in motion if this meeting does not live up to expectations.

 These suggestions are not meant to undermine the compelling framework
proffered by the authors of the "Guide." They may, perhaps, enhance
its workability.

Major Gen. (Res.) Shlomo Gazit's Comments

 I concur with IPF's praise of the Washington administration for its
initiative to convene the Annapolis summit. This will probably be the
last attempt in the next two years to advance the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. If a breakthrough is not achieved now, it is highly
doubtful that a further effort will be possible as we approach the end
of President George W. Bush's term in the White House, and the new
administration will require a period of reorganization and study
before launching new initiatives.

 Israelis and Palestinians directly involved in the conflict are
convinced that postponing the solution does not serve either side. It
will only pose additional obstacles to a compromise and an agreement.

 There is danger that the agreement will be accompanied by an outburst
of violence. Extremists on both sides oppose any compromise and will
attempt to prevent it by force. We all have to know that such a danger
exists although this should not prevent us from attending the summit
and seeking an agreement. Waiting longer will only increase such
threats, whereas achieving an agreement will mobilize public opinion,
bring massive support, together with decreased support for those who
oppose it.

 We have lived through many meetings and numerous attempts to reach an
agreement. Failed negotiations or agreements that fell through do not
mean that this is destined for failure. All conflicts have experienced
crises and failures to the point at which the parties could acquiesce
to conditions that were totally unacceptable only a day before. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is today at such a stage of readiness.

 Now, on the eve of the Annapolis summit, we are ignoring the changes
that have taken place. The situation is not static and we are witness
to important, even dramatic, developments, on both the Palestinian and
the Israeli side.

 It is common to point to the weakness of leadership on both sides.
This weakness is not necessarily a bad thing. On the contrary, it is
this very weakness which provides the condition and opportunity to
bring the participants to Annapolis.

 The Six Day War brought about the Arab Summit Conference in August
1967, and the "three No's" resolution: no recognition, no negotiations
and no to peace with Israel. Forty years have gone by and the leaders
of the same Arab states have convened once again in Saudi Arabia. This
time they emerged with three Yes's: yes to recognition, yes to
negotiations and yes to peace with Israel. They did not do so out of
love for Israel, but out of motivation to deal with urgent internal
and external problems that plague them, including the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

 To Israeli doomsayers—those who claim that the Palestinians only want
to see the elimination of Israel, and that in the upcoming
negotiations they will demand Israeli withdrawal from Jaffa, Haifa and
Beersheba—we heard Abu Allah, who heads the Palestinian negotiating
team, presenting the Palestinian opening stance: June 4, 1967 borders
with mutually-agreed adjustments on the basis of territorial
exchanges.

 As to the Israeli concern regarding the return of refugees to Israel,
the Saudi initiative, backed by a pan-Arab decision, called for a
resolution to the Palestinian problem only on the basis of a solution
agreeable to Israel.

 Israel is experiencing a similar process. The vision of Greater
Israel has been shelved, with the vast majority supporting the
two-state solution. Israel requests adjustments in the borders;
however, it acknowledges the need for territorial exchanges. This
position has even been accepted in the plan to re-divide Jerusalem,
with Al-Kuds as the Palestinian capital alongside Jerusalem, the
Israeli capital.

 The chances of success at Annapolis will be determined to a large
extent by the extent of the American hosts' involvement, by the
measure of initiative and creativity they show during the discussions,
and by the extent of their involvement in the agreement's
implementation process.

 It will be a pity if this opportunity is missed.

MK Colette Avital's Comments

 I have read thoroughly the policy paper drafted by Ambassadors
Pickering, Lewis, Walker, Pelletreau, and by Frederic Hof and Steven
Spiegel. It is thoughtful, balanced, creative, and as such it can
bring a great contribution toward the preparation of the International
Conference. Here are some additional comments, bringing my own
perspective but also reflecting some of the thinking in Israel.

 After more than seven years of terrorism and fighting, this is the
first time that Israelis and Palestinians will officially convene
again under an international umbrella, to renew the peace process.
Obviously, risks of failure exist and must be overcome. Failure itself
would be a fatal blow, as it could bring a radicalization of
Palestinian society and would bury prospects for a peaceful settlement
for a very long time.

 One of the goals of the Israeli leadership is to gather clear
international support for the negotiations. For both parties to be
able to make considerable concessions and convince their local
constituencies to accept them, international support is important but
not sufficient. For the conference to be successful, the outcome must
focus on the substance of a permanent peace, that is, in broad terms:
on the end game. The contours of such a permanent peace are well known
and can be based on the Clinton parameters, the Roadmap and the Arab
peace initiative.

 There is no doubt that a comprehensive peace agreement cannot and
will not be attained by the end of November. However, agreement on
principles can provide the necessary foundation to proceed with
detailed negotiations.

 The additional aims of the International Conference should be:

 1) To set in motion a mechanism of negotiations on each of the core
issues: borders, refugees, Jerusalem, security, etc. Even though
additional international meetings are desirable, it is progress on
these tracks that is of utmost importance.

 2) To accompany the peace process with tangible measures on the
ground which can improve the daily lives of citizens and at the same
time can increase the credibility of the peace process.

 These should include a comprehensive cease-fire on the West Bank; the
gradual removal of roadblocks, which would ensure greater freedom of
movement for the Palestinians; a joint effort to prevent arms
smuggling; a crackdown on militias; the dismantling of illegal
outposts; the freezing of settlement activity, etc.

 Thus, while providing concrete results as negotiations are being
held, this conference could provide positive motivation for their
continuation.

 Last but not least, the role of the international community:

 While direct negotiations between the parties are essential, the
international community, mainly the Quartet, should accompany them and
strengthen the parties by various measures. These include the
elaboration of an economic Marshall plan for the Palestinians, an
international mechanism that would monitor progress and
implementation, and at the same time a gradual process of
normalization of relations between Israel and the moderate Arab
countries.

 ________________________________

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