[WCUSP] Fwd: A Guide to a Successful November International Conference - IPF Focus Vol. 5.30

Sun Oct 14 14:39:13 CDT 2007

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Israel Policy Forum <ipfdc at ipforumdc.org>
Date: Oct 10, 2007 5:37 PM
Subject: A Guide to a Successful November International Conference -
IPF Focus Vol. 5.30
To: odilehh at gmail.com

October 10, 2007 / VOLUME 5.30Printer Friendly Version

A Guide to a Successful November International Conference

As part of its ongoing commitment to policy analysis, Israel Policy
Forum sponsored a study group that produced "A Guide to a Successful
November International Conference." This report has been shared with
key governments and widely reported in the press. This week's IPF
Focus presents the report in full. It is signed by:

 Frederic C. Hof: lead drafter of the Mitchell Report (Sharm el-Sheikh
Fact-Finding Committee) in 2001, U.S. Army Attache in Lebanon, and
Director for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian Affairs in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense;

Ambassador Samuel Lewis: U.S. Ambassador to Israel under Presidents
Carter and Reagan, Director of Policy Planning at the State Department
in the first Clinton term, senior policy advisor to the Israel Policy
Forum;

Ambassador Robert Pelletreau – former Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, former US Ambassador to Egypt, Tunisia and
Bahrain, member of the U.S. delegation to the 1991 Madrid Middle East
Peace Conference;

Ambassador Thomas Pickering: former Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, former US Ambassador to the UN, as well as to
Russia, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria and Jordan;

Dr. Steven L. Spiegel, Director of the Center for Middle East
Development and Professor of Political Science at UCLA; national
scholar of the Israel Policy Forum;

Ambassador Edward S. Walker: Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs in the George W. Bush and Clinton administrations and
US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

 President Bush has announced an international meeting devoted to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be held in the fall, presumably
mid-November, and likely in Washington, D.C. This is a potentially
important step in moving the stalled peace process forward, especially
given the recent appointment of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair as
the Quartet's Middle East envoy.

 The November conference can provide a focal point, and to some extent
a deadline, for initial progress. It has certainly encouraged Prime
Minister Olmert and President Abbas to meet regularly and with
increasing frequency to develop some kind of framework or Declaration
of Principles (or Statement of Understandings, as some are now calling
it), which can be presented at the meeting as a specific
accomplishment. It also serves as a vehicle for involving other
parties in the region as well as members of the international
community to create a consensus on immediate movement. The ultimate
aim of course should be an Arab-Israeli settlement based on UN
Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002), and 1515 (2003); the
Madrid Principles; the Arab Peace Initiative, and the Road Map.

 Despite these positive objectives, there are serious challenges.
Expectations in the region have been raised, and many are hoping for a
significant political breakthrough. At the same time, the criteria for
success are vague and the perceptions of the various players and
potential players differ widely. The meeting as it stands now seems to
be something of a gamble. If it fails, resulting in disappointment and
disillusionment, it could further set back the situation in the Middle
East. Given the varying degrees of expectations and the perhaps
exaggerated hopes that have been raised, the chances of a perceived
failure even without a breakup are profound.

 The risks of failure are several. There are a variety of spoilers who
may seek to prevent the meeting from being held or to bury its
achievements in violence. This includes militant Palestinian
organizations that, already, have been intensifying rocket attacks. It
also includes Syria, whose issues (notably the return of the Golan)
remain conspicuously absent from the agenda. The question of how to
handle Hamas in organizing and running the conference and in its
aftermath will remain an issue even as the United States, Israel, and
the Palestinian Authority are vehemently opposed to Hamas'
representation. This opposition has served to increase Hamas'
popularity in Gaza, according to observer reports, and also to make it
more difficult for the Saudis to form a new Palestinian unity
government and/or to encourage a more moderate stance among some in
Hamas. Maximizing the prospects for a successful meeting entails
finding a way to deal with both Hamas and Syria (even though it has
now been invited) in its run-up.

 The following recommendations are designed to mitigate the chances of
failure and to enhance the prospects of a successful international
conference. We define success as an outcome that creates the momentum
for continued progress and movement toward a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

 1. A Series of Meetings, not a One-Off: The United States should
announce that this meeting will be only the first in a series intended
to promote agreements as they are reached between the parties with the
assistance of outsiders such as the United States, while keeping the
door open for wider attendance at later meetings. The advantage of a
series of meetings is that it reduces the burden of expectations
falling on the planned fall gathering by providing relief from the
notion that this one meeting will determine whether there is movement
in the Arab-Israeli peace process, at least during the duration of
this American administration.

2. The Statement of Understandings: The meeting will certainly be
judged in large measure on the Statement of Understandings reached by
Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas. At present, the very fact
that these two men are speaking has reduced Washington to waiting and
watching to see whether or not the discussions can succeed on their
own. But we believe that hope is not enough. Political developments on
both sides are already working to encourage a dilution of the
Principles on which agreement might be reached. Too feeble an
agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians could well jeopardize
the entire initiative.

The Bush Administration cannot remain on the sidelines for long. It
must have contingency plans to work for a successful Statement, and it
must balance the internal opposition to Prime Minister Olmert and
Prime Minister Abbas with strong backing for a meaningful document.
The administration must also be ready to move in at any time prior to
and during the meeting with its own bridging proposals. In this
regard, Secretary of State Rice's periodic trips to the region to
check on progress in preparing the Declaration are critical. But even
if she applies sufficient leverage on both parties to keep the process
on track, her trips are by their very nature insufficient.

 She needs to use Tony Blair, or someone else, between her trips, to
work on the players full time to produce a document that has a minimum
of sale-ability in Ramallah and Riyadh. Moreover, there should be a
strong US push in private to ascertain what the Saudis have to see in
the document to guarantee their high level attendance. If, despite
these concerted efforts, this Declaration is not completed or at least
almost agreed upon before the conference begins, the meeting should be
postponed until it is ready.

 3. Details of the Statement: A successful Statement should include
the following six elements: (1) the reaffirmation that the process
will end in two independent and sovereign states; (2) borders between
those two states based on the 1967 lines with adjustments in territory
between them as mutually agreed upon; (3) a just solution for the
refugee question that is agreed by the two sides, and is consistent
with the notion of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people and
Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people; (4) agreement
that there will be two capitals in Jerusalem, with Jewish
neighborhoods falling under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods
under Palestinian sovereignty; (5) special arrangements for the Holy
basin that will guarantee access for all religions and (6) security
arrangements, including a non-militarized Palestinian state. It is
possible that the two leaders could jointly declare either before or
during the conference that they endorse the Blair mission and welcome
international assistance to reach and implement a serious agreement.

4. UNSC Endorsement: Whatever Statement of Understandings emerges from
the international conference should be promptly endorsed by the United
Nations Security Council. The United States should support such a
move, assuring full international backing for the arrangement agreed
by Israel and the Palestinians.

5. A Facilitating Agreement: Even a successful Declaration of
Principles between the parties and its endorsement by the United
Nations may not be enough to carry forward this process into the
future. Therefore, additional mechanisms will be necessary to make
sure that the parties can move ahead to a second meeting held within
three to four months afterward. Presumably, additional regional
participants (including Syria whether or not it attends the first
meeting) would be invited to this follow-up conference, which itself
would not be designed as the end in the series.

In this light, we recommend a second agreement between the Israelis
and Palestinians, a facilitating agreement that would be intended to
enhance the prospects for the broadening and deepening of the new
opportunities created by the Statement of Understandings. This
Facilitating Agreement would either be concluded at the conference, or
more likely, an initial framework would be announced at the meeting,
and the details concluded in the weeks that followed. Negotiating such
an agreement should be the focus of the United States and Quartet
Middle East Envoy Tony Blair.

Such an agreement must address the security issue for Israel with a
full cessation of the use of force. While this approach has failed
many times, a delineation of ways in which the Palestinian Authority
can participate in preventing violent steps (including suicide
bombings and rocket attacks) against Israelis must be stipulated.
These must be measurable means by which success or failure can be
judged in leading to next steps.

Simultaneously, the treatment of the Palestinians by Israelis must be
handled in a way that will promote President Abbas' capacity to
exercise a leadership role. Therefore, steps should be discussed and
promises made whose success can be calculated. These types of
potential steps include the dismantling of the illegal outposts, the
freezing of settlements, the additional return of prisoners, and the
issue of reorganizing checkpoints and of assuring greater freedom of
access and movement.

6. Conference Participation: It is important that the representation
at the meeting be as broad as possible. Presumably the more
substantive the Statement of Understandings, the more likely Arab
countries such as Saudi Arabia will attend. The holding of further
meetings could be used as a device to ensure broader and higher-level
Arab participation as progress is made in the negotiations. Subsequent
conferences should be designed to report on greater progress and to
reach additional agreements on wider issues such as Syria and Lebanon,
which would be facilitated by the expanded involvement of additional
states.

The Saudi presence at the first meeting would be a critical impetus to
the new process, but we are unlikely to know until the last minute
whether the Saudis will indeed engage. (It is worth noting that Saudi
representation at the Madrid conference in October 1991 only occurred
at the very last moment.) The administration should not allow the
failure of any particular Arab country (beyond Palestine) to attend to
be defined as the success or failure of the meeting, even as it seeks
to engage as many states as possible.
 It is imperative that those who participate in the conference be at
least at cabinet level. Representatives of the Quartet should be
present as well.

The most difficult problem in preparing any international meeting,
and, indeed, in following up on that meeting, will be the role of
Hamas. Since Abu Mazen does not control Gaza or the Hamas security
forces or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the propaganda and hate
material coming out of Gaza, he can only be held accountable for the
forces, political decisions and information outlets that he controls.
But that means that Hamas now rules a third of the Palestinian
populace in the territories and has the capacity, presumably violent,
to attempt to undermine any meeting or agreement. Moreover, there are
many reports that US and Israeli policy (to which Fatah now
subscribes) enhances the credibility of Hamas and drives any moderates
among them toward the hard line.

 What to do to overcome this conundrum, which must be addressed and in
considerable detail, if the initiative is to have any chance of
success? First, the US might consider announcing that all parties
attending will have to accept the Arab Peace Initiative, whatever
Statement of Understandings is reached by Abbas and Olmert, and the
principle of a Facilitating Agreement that will be on the conference
agenda. If Hamas were to take these steps, then it would in effect be
accepting the three conditions set forth by the Quartet last year
(recognition of Israel, no violence, acceptance of prior agreements),
but instead of accepting an international diktat, it would be doing so
along with other participants, and therefore technically not being
singled out. Second, there could also be an agreement to leave the
Hamas issue to the second conference, while making it clear to Hamas
through an appropriate intermediary that the option of their
attendance would be on the table in the second round as long as they
similarly accepted the Abbas/Olmert Statement of Understandings, the
Arab Peace Initiative, and the Facilitating Agreement. This option
might prevent Hamas from trying to torpedo the conference, and even
encourage it to try to prevent Islamic Jihad from doing so. Whatever
combination of these or other alternatives the administration chooses
to pursue, we urge it to plan carefully with our Mideast partners to
formulate a workable strategy; simply saying no to Hamas without
planning for the consequences is a likely ticket to new problems.

7. The Next Conference: The meeting should not end without an
indication of a target date for its resumption. If the subsequent
Facilitating Agreement is framed in measurable ways, then the
prospects for the next meeting can be judged by the willingness and
ability of the parties to fulfill their commitments. However, there
must be a second criterion for reconvening the meeting, and this is
relative success in deepening the Statement of Understandings. This
success can be judged through a variety of means:

a. The parties might attempt to conclude an agreement or a draft final
text on a particular issue covered by the Declaration of Principles,
such as borders.

b. Success might be measured by movement on efforts regarding several
of the issues simultaneously, with an interim progress report
presented at the meeting.

c. Sufficient success for reconvening the meeting might be determined
by a generalized acceptance of the Abbas/Olmert Declaration from a
variety of parties (e.g., the Quartet, the UNSC as previously
mentioned, the Arab League, and perhaps even Hamas).

d. Other equivalent progress, such as a framework for progress with
Syria and Lebanon, if it could be worked out.

e. The subsequent successful conclusion of the Facilitating Agreement,
especially if it initially produces positive results, might in and of
itself be sufficient to convene the first follow-up conference.

8. Incentives: Another means of promoting progress, preventing a
breakdown, and promoting the possibility of additional meetings will
be to structure a series of incentives for the parties to continue on
with the process. The series of meetings concept could be a mechanism
for building a more flexible timeline, to address the fears of each
party, and also to meet the need for maintaining momentum.

Certainly, Syria will have an incentive to desist from serving as a
spoiler if the regime believes cooperation will bring it more through
participation down the road.

 We believe the Israelis would be most interested in a series of
international conferences if they had clear ideas of what the
deliverables would be from each of those meetings. For example, they
are keen to have Saudi participation for the upcoming meeting because
they view it as a major first step forward toward normalization. One
meeting is not normalization; it is what comes after the meeting.
While we cannot speak for the Saudis or the other Arab countries, we
assume that if they saw the bilateral Palestinian track moving
forwards, and as commitments are implemented on the ground, with
verification, a step by step approach to normalization would be
acceptable to them. If it is not, the process could easily get
stalled, and sooner than later.

 What kinds of steps do we have in mind? Public diplomacy at home in
preparing Arab populations for peace, government sponsored academic
discussions on regional trade commissions/contact groups, convening
regional security groups to discuss security architecture, etc. It is
not too early for Secretary Rice and Envoy Blair to begin to talk with
the parties about a balanced process in which concrete Israeli acts as
we envision in the Facilitating Agreement are met by substantive acts
by Arab states. Mini Israeli concessions followed by mini Arab steps
toward normalization. We recommend starting small but addressing
critical issues that are important to Israel and Arab countries.

 For the Palestinians, a series of meetings only works if their lives
are enhanced in a very tangible way by the terms of the agreements,
and quickly. How do they keep the rolling conferences from becoming
all process and no substance, in terms of what is happening on the
ground? What deliverables do the Palestinians get from a second or
third international conference? At least in the early stages, the
positive consequences will go primarily, even exclusively, to the West
Bank, a problem in and of itself. But it is therefore even more
imperative that the Palestinians witness the revitalization of the
West Bank economy through regularizing the transfer of funds and the
other types of steps outlined in our discussion of the Facilitating
Agreement above, including the dismantling of the illegal outposts,
the freezing of settlements, and the reorganizing of checkpoints. Of
course, any steps in concretizing the Principles in the Declaration
will further serve to encourage most Palestinians.

 9. What if the Process Breaks Down? It is certainly possible; some
would say likely, that the conference will not take place or will
break down either during or after the meeting. What then? In case of a
collapse, the best course would be to persevere, while seeking to
bring along the recalcitrant parties. In attempting to convince them,
the US as always has carrots and sticks at its disposal, but perhaps
the most effective means of persuading the parties would be for the
administration to demonstrate through its determined perseverance that
it will not give up, but is committed to the success of its
initiative. We should demand the same of ourselves as we do of the
parties: 100 percent effort, even if it does not result in 100 percent
success.

Conclusion:

We believe that the process outlined here, with a series of
conferences, a Declaration of Principles endorsed by the U.N., a
Facilitating Agreement for next steps on the ground, and a broad-based
regional representation at the first conference would trigger
additional international conferences and a new Israeli-Palestinian
momentum. The outcome would create a program that would not rise or
fall on the success of one meeting this November and would establish a
somewhat different process than has ever been attempted before. We
believe that these recommendations, if implemented, would enhance the
prospects of success over the next several months.

 ________________________________

IPF Focus is published weekly, by the Israel Policy Forum.

For more information about how to subscribe by email, fax or regular
mail, call 212.245.4227
 or visit our website at www.israelpolicyforum.org .

To unsubscribe from the email list, click here.

National Office: 165 East 56th Street, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10022
 Tel: 212.245.4227 | Fax: 212.245.0517 | ipf at ipforum.org
 Washington Office:
 Tel: 202.347.3811 | Fax: 202.347.6130 | ipfdc at ipforumdc.org
 Israel Office: 43 Emek Refaim Street, Suite 10, Jerusalem Israel 93141
 Tel: 972.2.561.7258 | Fax: 972.2.561.7437
www.israelpolicyforum.org