[WCUSP] Fwd: Engagement versus Isolation: A Discussion with Ephraim Sneh and Alon Liel - IPF Focus Vol. 5.33

Thu Nov 1 17:22:09 CDT 2007

This is inly one position for discussion not a WILPF Policy

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From: Israel Policy Forum <ipfdc at ipforumdc.org>
Date: Nov 1, 2007 12:06 PM
Subject: Engagement versus Isolation: A Discussion with Ephraim Sneh
and Alon Liel - IPF Focus Vol. 5.33
To: odilehh at gmail.com

November 1, 2007 / VOLUME 5.33Printer Friendly Version

Engagement versus Isolation:

A Discussion with Ephraim Sneh and Alon Liel

 On October 25, 2007, Ephraim Sneh and Alon Liel participated in an
Israel Policy Forum conference call moderated by Professor Steven L.
Spiegel. The following is a summary of their remarks.

 Minister Ephraim Sneh served twice as Israel's deputy defense
minister. He has held several other important cabinet posts and is a
leading figure of the labor party.

 Dr. Alon Liel is a former Director General of Israel's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. He has served in several foreign ministry posts and
has spearheaded unofficial negotiations with prominent Syrians on a
Syrian-Israeli treaty.

 Their opinions are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of IPF.

 Minister Ephraim Sneh:

The Annapolis conference will not necessarily result in failure. It
will also not result in a final deal. Instead, Annapolis could serve
as a venue for Israelis and Palestinians to come to an understanding
on the basic principles of a future agreement. Annapolis, however,
should not be an end in itself. It should, rather, serve as a starting
point for a process of detailed negotiations on a Palestinian-Israeli
political horizon.

 Success in Annapolis could begin a transformative process for
Palestinians. A peace process that works toward a political horizon
will weaken Hamas. If Palestinians experience a substantial
improvement in their quality of life, witness positive developments in
the peace process, and envision a political horizon for a future
state, Hamas will lose its grip on Gaza.

 It would be a mistake, therefore, to include Hamas in the process of
negotiations. While Hamas will not agree to the minimum requirements
for negotiation, the current Palestinian government of Abu Mazen
(Mahmoud Abbas) and Salam Fayyad represent the moderate majority of
Palestinians that want peace with Israel. This fundamental gap between
Fatah and Hamas is unbridgeable. An attempt to co-opt Hamas by
bringing them to Annapolis would pull the rug from under the
Palestinian moderates currently negotiating with Israel.

 The Syrian government of Bashar Assad, on the other hand, does want
to talk to Israel. While the situation on the ground is not what it
was during previous attempts at Syrian-Israeli negotiations—Syria is
now an Iranian puppet—Annapolis could serve as grounds to explore
whether there is a basis in negotiations. The main purpose of
Annapolis, however, is to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and
must remain so.

 There is the will to resolve the conflict among Palestinians and
Israelis, as well as in the international arena. There is a
Palestinian leadership that is eager to have peace with Israel. The
majority of both Palestinians and Israelis support a peace agreement.
Olmert has the necessary endorsement within the Knesset for an initial
understanding with the Palestinians. Instead of measuring the ability
of Olmert and Abbas to make peace, we should be working to strengthen
that ability.

 Failure in Annapolis would have catastrophic results. If the
negotiating process fails, the message to the Palestinians would be
that moderates can't deliver a Palestinian state and their only
remaining option would be Hamas. Iran, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad are
waiting for the process to fail. Failure in and following Annapolis
would have disastrous consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians.
We cannot afford such a failure.

 Dr. Alon Liel:

As long as potential spoilers—Hamas and Syria—are completely isolated,
prospects for success in Annapolis remain bleak. The fact that Hamas
was elected to the legislative council in January 2006 and that it now
controls the Gaza Strip should not be ignored. By engaging in
negotiations with the government of Abu Mazen and Salam Fayyad, while
ignoring Hamas, Israel is in fact encouraging the establishment of two
separate Palestinian states—one that wants peace and is willing to
live alongside Israel and a Hamas state that will act as an Iranian
proxy and be unacceptable to the Israeli public. This policy of
isolation, along with the catastrophic effects of economically
isolating Gaza, will prevent the establishment of the very Palestinian
state that Israel is aiming at.

 This does not mean that Hamas should be negotiated with in the
confines of the Annapolis conference. Annapolis is not necessarily the
appropriate venue. Isolating Hamas completely, however, will both
allow it to act as spoiler to the conference and to oppose any
compromises that Abu Mazen may make as a result of it.

 Fatah and Hamas are currently engaged in a war. If this situation is
allowed—or encouraged—to continue, the results will be devastating. In
order to implement an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, it is at least
necessary for Fatah and Hamas to be on speaking terms.

 While engaging with Hamas does not necessarily mean including it in
the Annapolis talks, Syria should definitely be included. If the
chance of success in Annapolis is lowered by the current isolation of
Hamas, isolating Syria would assure failure. By including Syria,
Israel could create a situation in which Syria not only refrains from
acting as a spoiler, but also discourages Hamas from doing so.

 There is no doubt that Syrian President, Bashar Assad, wants to come
to Annapolis. Coming to Washington, at a time when he is boycott by
the United States, would be of utmost importance to him. The benefits
of allowing Syria to participate in the conference, outweigh the
possible drawbacks.

 With Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank, the Palestinian arena
is not ready for an agreement with Israel. It is, furthermore,
uncertain whether Olmert could get the majority of the Knesset, or
even the Israeli public, to support an agreement with Abu Mazen, as
long as Hamas controls Gaza.

 Negotiating with the "good guys," Abu Mazen and Salam Fayyad, will
not bring success to Annapolis. Israel should include the "bad guys"
in order to, at the very least, assure that they don't act as
spoilers. Isolating Hamas and Syria, will strengthen their ability to
fight the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. We want the fighting to
end.

 ________________________________

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