[WCUSP] Haaretz: The third Lebanon war?

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 w w w . h a a r e t z . c o  m  
_http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/794993.html_ (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/794993.html)     
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Last update - 11:41 01/12/2006
North and south
By _Amos Harel_ (mailto:contact at haaretz.co.il)  and Avi  Issacharoff

1.The third Lebanon war 

There  will be a war next summer. Only the sector has not been chosen yet. 
The  atmosphere in the Israel Defense Forces in the past month has been very  
pessimistic. The latest rounds in the campaigns on both fronts, Lebanon  and the 
Gaza Strip, have left too many issues undecided, too many  potential 
detonators that could cause a new conflagration. The army's  conclusion from this is 
that a war in the new future is a reasonable  possibility. As Amir Oren 
reported in Haaretz several weeks ago, the IDF's  operative assumption is that during 
the coming summer months, a war will  break out against Hezbollah and perhaps 
against Syria as well. 

At  the same time, the IDF does not anticipate a long life for the cease-fire 
 achieved last Saturday night with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. When  
the present tahdiya (lull) joins its predecessors that fell apart - the  hudna 
(cease-fire) of summer 2003 (which lasted for a month and a half)  and the 
tahdiya of winter 2005 (which was in its death throes for months  until its 
final burial at the end of the disengagement) - there is a  danger that the big 
bang will take place in Gaza. At its conclusion, like  a self- fulfilling 
prophecy, IDF soldiers will return to the heart of  Rafah for the first time in 13 
years. 

Of the two worrisome  scenarios, the IDF speaks more in public about a 
conflagration in Gaza,  but is also genuinely worried about a war in the North, 
mainly in light of  the army's dubious achievements in the previous round there. 
Deputy Chief  of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky has recently spoken about a war in the 
North in  the summer, in several closed military forums. The army is already  
undergoing an intensive process of preparation, which is based in part on  
lessons already learned from the second Lebanon war. The announcement this  week 
of a renewal of reservist training at the Tze'elim training base is a  signal 
to neighboring countries that the IDF is reinforcing and  rehabilitating 
itself, but it was also meant for internal consumption: It  broadcasts to the public 
and to the army that the process of post-war  rehabilitation is being 
conducted with the requisite seriousness.  

Do all signs lead to war? One senior defense official says the  answer to 
this question is no. He says that what we are dealing with is  more a question of 
image than of substance. The extremist assessment of  the good chances of a 
conflict in the North is designed to present the  army with a target (and more 
important, with a target date). By summer  preparations will be completed, and 
the IDF will brush itself off and  restore the professional capability that 
it mistakenly thought it had when  Israel so hastily went to war last summer. 

The process of  rehabilitating the army's preparedness is combined with 
efforts by Chief  of Staff Dan Halutz to present the investigation of the recent 
war (which  is supposed to end in about two weeks) as his crowning achievement. 
In  spite of his denials, Halutz is seriously considering resigning, but is  
looking for the proper context. The conclusion of the inquest, which  Halutz 
describes as the most thorough and honest that the IDF has ever  conducted, is 
likely to provide such a context. The chief of staff can say  that he is 
leaving his successor with a clean desk and that after  comprehensive 
rehabilitation, the army is once again on the right path.  

In view of the risk of war against Syria, chief of Military  Intelligence 
Amos Yadlin is talking about Israel's obligation to examine  the possibility of 
renewing peace negotiations with Damascus. In this,  Yadlin is joining his 
predecessor, Major General Aharon Ze'evi Farkash.  And like his own predecessor, 
Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is  also reacting with displeasure to 
this talk, and wondering aloud whether  the head of MI is not exceeding the 
bounds of his authority. Nevertheless,  at least in the Lebanese arena, Olmert 
recently reexamined the possibility  of compromising with the Siniora 
government on the question of the Shaba  Farms (Har Dov). With or without any 
connection, a UN team has begun a  project to map the area in order to decide on the 
size of the  controversial region. The mapping work is being done at UN 
headquarters in  New York, on the basis of maps and satellite photos. 

Olmert has  been told that there is little chance that Syria would agree to 
an  arrangement in which Israel would transfer this area to Lebanon. According  
to this assessment, Syrian President Bashar Assad is not enthusiastic  about 
the possibility. When proposals for a remapping of the  Syrian-Lebanese border 
were made to Assad, he replied that he would agree  to that only if it began 
in the area of Tripoli in the north. In other  words: as far as possible from 
the Shaba farms. 

2. Palestinian  freeze 

In the Palestinian arena, the sides are returning to  square one at the end 
of this week. Although the firing of Qassams has  lessened in recent days, the 
Hamas government of Ismail Haniyeh refuses to  give up its place. Haniyeh has 
embarked on a visit to Arab countries that  will last for about two weeks. 
Until his return, no practical negotiations  are taking place between Fatah and 
Hamas over the establishment of the  national unity government. 

At the beginning of the week, in the  wake of the cease-fire, the Israeli 
side drew up complex, multi-stage  scenarios regarding an overall deal that also 
involves the release of  kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit and the establishment 
of a new Palestinian  government. However, as usual, the internal Palestinians 
arena is even  more chaotic than Israel realizes. Apparently nothing has been 
decided yet  in the Shalit affair. And the fate of the government of 
technocrats, which  Haniyeh and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu 
Mazen) have  been discussing for months, is still unclear. 

In the office of the  chairman they were angry this week, but not only at 
Hamas. Abbas vented  his frustration at a meeting that he held with Haniyeh on 
Monday. The  chairman told the prime minister that he would no longer discuss a  
national unity government with him. If you think you'll succeed in  removing 
the siege on your government without my help, he told him -  tfadal (be my 
guest). The frustration in Abbas' circle is directed to a  great extent against 
the Egyptians, who went out of their way this week to  flatter Khaled Meshal, 
head of the Hamas political bureau in Damascus. It  began with a press 
conference convened by Meshal in the Cairo press club,  continued with an interview he 
gave to Egyptian television, and ended with  a visit by Haniyeh and his 
entourage in Cairo, the first stop on the prime  minister's journey. One of Abbas' 
men mentioned in disappointment that  Egyptian intelligence chief Omar 
Suleiman himself had promised the  chairman that Egypt would not allow Haniyeh to 
travel abroad via the Rafah  crossing for the purpose of raising money for the 
Hamas government.  

The price of Haniyeh's trip is clear to Abbas. Only last week two  Hamas 
senior officials brought $25 million into the Gaza Strip in  suitcases via the 
Rafah crossing. That is a huge sum in terms of the  present Gazan economy, and 
not a single dollar of it will reach the  coffers of the PA. The entire sum is 
earmarked for the Hamas charity  apparatus and for the organization's military 
arm. At present, the return  of Haniyeh's entourage from abroad means 
additional millions of dollars  for Hamas, whereas Fatah is suffering from mounting 
budgetary distress.  

Abbas' people are afraid that if the Shalit deal is finally  completed, only 
Hamas will benefit from it. The release of hundreds of  Palestinian prisoners 
from Israeli prisons will be attributed to the force  of Hamas' arms, rather 
than to the conciliatory approach of Abbas - in  spite of Olmert's promises to 
release the prisoners into his arms. Abbas'  men made a last, almost desperate 
attempt this week to get things to work  for their benefit. They secretly 
turned to the two splinter groups that  helped Hamas to kidnap Shalit - the 
Popular Resistance Committees and Jish  al-Islam (the Army of Islam) - and 
suggested that they hand the soldier  over to the chairman. The chances of success for 
such a move are slight.  

As things look at the moment, Hamas is emerging strengthened from  the 
cease-fire, and its position will continue to improve after the Shalit  deal. The 
surprising support from Egypt will further solidify the position  of Haniyeh and 
Meshal in the unity government contacts. 

Fatah is  nevertheless likely to register one achievement from the completion 
of a  prisoner-release deal - if senior Palestinian prisoner Marwan Barghouti 
is  among those freed. The release of Barghouti, who was sentenced in Israel  
to five cumulative life sentences, will ease the sting of the Hamas  
achievement and will restore Fatah's men in the field to public awareness.  Israel has 
been discussing the possibility of his release for several  years, in the 
hope of igniting a political move together with the Fatah  leadership. A number 
of IDF generals have even expressed their support of  this. On the other hand, 
the idea was sharply opposed by former Shin Bet  security services chief Avi 
Dichter and his successor Yuval Diskin. This  week someone in Jerusalem made 
sure to brief the political correspondents  about Barghouti's substantial 
contribution, from his prison cell, to  bringing about the cease-fire agreement. 

Dichter and Diskin have a  convincing argument: Barghouti was involved in the 
murder of Israelis. The  leading gang of the Fatah military wing in the West 
Bank gathered around  him and were inspired by him in their operations at the 
start of the  intifada. The courts were convinced by the materials collected 
by the Shin  Bet and MI, and convicted Barghouti of acts of murder. On the 
other hand,  Barghouti has been actively involved for years in steps to achieve a  
cessation of the fighting. Yet this time it was urgent for political  bodies 
in Israel to give credit to the senior prisoner. Perhaps this can  be seen as 
preparing the ground for his release in a future deal.  

While Olmert, in taking the dual steps of agreeing to the  cease-fire and 
making the hopeful speech at the grave of David Ben-Gurion,  created the 
appearance of a diplomatic process with the Palestinians,  security elements are 
skeptical about the chances of survival of the  agreement with the PA. Halutz 
hinted at that in the Knesset Foreign  Affairs and Defense Committee, when he said 
that the political leadership  had "consulted partially" with the IDF about 
the agreement. 

The  army and the Shin Bet see eye to eye concerning the processes taking 
place  in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is building in Gaza a southern version of  
Hezbollah-land, and the cease-fire will enable it to increase its strength  without 
interference, by carrying on with the arms-smuggling industry. The  calm will 
collapse at the time most convenient for the enemy, not for  Israel. For the 
present, in order to defend itself from claims that it  caused the cease-fire 
to fail, the IDF is awaiting precise instructions  from the political 
leadership. These have not been forthcoming, and the  army has to guess the intentions 
of the politicians and, based on them, to  determine its instructions for 
opening fire. 

3. Ofra is  expanding 

A Peace Now report about the settlements, which  merited only limited 
coverage in the Israeli media, made considerable  waves abroad. The New York Times 
thought that the revelations by Dror  Etkes - the head of the organization's 
Settlements Watch program, who said  that 40 percent of the settlement areas in 
the West Bank are located on  private Palestinian land - was a front-page 
story. The detailed data  gathered by Peace Now, which are backed by aerial photos 
and information  about the legal status of each plot of land, indicate that no 
fewer than  130 settlements were built on private Palestinian property. 

Senior  officials in the Israeli Civil Administration confirm the reliability 
of  the data and the conclusion to be drawn from them: The most significant  
violation of the law in the territories is not related so much to the  
outposts, but rather to the large and well-established settlements, which  in Israeli 
discourse are considered legitimate. (The Judea and Samaria  Regional Council 
denies this, and claims that all the construction in the  settlements is done 
on state land.) 

The settlement of Ofra, north  of Ramallah, is a good example. Seen as the 
flagship of Gush Emunim (the  original settlers' movement), this community sits 
on Palestinian land,  according to the report. Not all of it, it's true. Only 
93 percent. In  light of this, the debate about last February's demolition of 
nine houses  in its satellite outpost, Amona, seems somewhat marginal. 

Etkes'  team obtained aerial photos that document the development of Ofra in 
four  stages, from its establishment in 1969 until today. Almost all the  
construction has been carried out on land belonging to Palestinians from  the 
neighboring villages. Peace Now relies on a databank similar to the  one 
coordinated by deputy defense minister Brigadier General (res.) Baruch  Spiegel, whose 
main principles were published in Haaretz about two months  ago. The U.S. 
administration, which keeps close track of any information  about the settlements, 
has since asked for clarifications from the defense  establishment. But Big 
Brother's surveillance does not really affect what  happens on the ground. On 
the contrary: The present days of the shaky  Olmert government are good for the 
settlers. The tractors are once again  working energetically on the hills of 
Samaria, while Defense Minister Amir  Peretz continues to issue weekly notices 
about his intention of dealing  soon and with utmost seriousness with the 
construction in the outposts.  
 
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